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ABSTRACT 
 Red Team testing is a proven method to improve cybersecurity on organizational 
networks. However, due to the low availability of required expertise in this field, red 
teaming is prohibitively expensive to conduct on a large scale. In response, the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense has sponsored research to build a Red Team in a Box (RTIB) 
tool to perform many of the basic red team functions without requiring the user to have 
in-depth knowledge of red teaming tools and techniques. This research has resulted in the 
prototype implementation of CARTT, the Cyber Automated Red Team Tool. 
 This thesis extended CARTT from its current stand-alone host-based 
implementation to include the ability to identify potential targets on a range network, 
communicate results to a command node, and respond to orders to attack from the 
command node. Redesigning the CARTT as a client/server system allows system 
administrators to access the tool remotely, affording increased cybersecurity throughout 
the Navy’s networks while reducing the cost of red teaming. Additionally, the 
client/server model mitigates the risk of having Metasploit and OpenVAS installed on 
machines throughout these target networks. A messaging system was implemented that 
facilitates a command and control channel between users.  
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A. RESEARCH PURPOSE 
Red teaming has a proven history of ensuring cyber security when it is conducted 
and documented properly. However, the training, expertise, and knowledge of appropriate 
tools and techniques required to perform effective red teaming come with a significant cost 
in time and resources. As a result, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has 
sponsored research into developing a tool that performs automated red teaming actions 
without the need for its user to be an expert in the field. The goal of this research has been 
to design and implement a software tool that achieves this objective. Previous research has 
yielded a prototype called the Cyber Automated Red Team Tool (CARTT) [1], [2]. 
Red teaming requires an in depth understanding of specialized tools, systems, and 
techniques that allow one to fully assess a target system for vulnerabilities that may be 
exploitable by adversaries, as well as the target’s ability to withstand and respond to those 
exploitations. Developing red team expertise through training, however, is expensive and 
time consuming, and many of the tools used for these purposes are expensive or lack 
intuitive interfaces for non-expert users. [3], [4]. These constraints create high barriers for 
large organizations such as the Department of Defense (DoD) to fully train and maintain 
adequate red team experts to test their massive number of systems [5], [6], [7].  
Red teaming, if done incorrectly, can result in cyber effects similar to those of a 
malicious actor. These effects could include denial and/or degradation of services, loss of 
data, or loss of data integrity. To prevent such outcomes, red teaming must be conducted 
in a careful, deliberate manner where all personnel involved understand the risks.  
While implementing the CARTT system as a client/server model will allow greater access 
to its capabilities, it also may increase the possibility of it being used maliciously to disrupt 
or degrade network operations. To mitigate this risk, strong authentication is used in  
the system. 
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B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The purpose of this research is to implement a simple red teaming system that is 
accessible through a browser-based interface, as a way to increase cyber security 
throughout the DoD while limiting the costs associated with training and maintaining cyber 
red teams. This system should empower local defenders by providing them a deeper 
understanding of their network security. Additionally, the system should reduce the 
workload on the limited red testing assets currently employed throughout the DoD. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In this research, we investigate how a highly automated red teaming tool can be 
developed using a client/server model that relies on open source software and provides 
user-friendly functionality while having strong security features. The following are the key 
questions for this research: 
1. Primary Question 
How can CARTT be transformed from a stand-alone application into a system that 
employs a client/server model? 
2. Secondary Questions 
(1) How can CARTT employ a command-and-control channel between its 
Operators and Commanders?   
(2) How can CARTT Operators use the system to remotely conduct red teaming 
analysis of a network to which they are not attached? 
D. SCOPE OF THESIS 
This thesis examines previous research on red teaming tools in order to develop a 
highly automated, user friendly, secure client/server system that performs network 
discovery, vulnerability analysis, and exploitation testing using open source software on a 
target network. The focus is to facilitate command and control (C2) between users, manage 
user accounts, and provide user authentication. 
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E. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
This thesis resulted in an automated red team tool that can be accessed without 
requiring any additional software deployed on endpoint client systems. Operators can use 
the tool to generate timely, meaningful vulnerability analysis of their networks that would 
traditionally require personnel with expensive red team training and experience. Through 
its implementation, the system can improve the overall cybersecurity of DoD networks. 
F. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: 
1. Chapter II: Background 
Chapter II details the current state of DoD Red Teams, including manpower, 
funding, and training issues that have contributed to a shortfall in DoD Red Team 
capability. It also examines commercial and open source products available for conducting 
red teaming. 
2. Chapter III: Design 
Chapter III describes the design choices that were made in transforming CARTT 
from a stand-alone program to a client/server model. We highlight the emphasis that was 
placed on simplicity and security in designing the client interface and background 
processes. This chapter concludes by outlining the process flow and system relationships 
inside of CARTT. 
3. Chapter IV: Implementation 
Chapter IV discusses the technical implementation of the CARTT system. It 
describes in detail how the underlying subsystems, mySQL, PHP, MSF, and OpenVAS are 
used to automate red team assessments, provide security, and present the user with a simple 
user interface. 
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4. Chapter V: Conclusions and Future Work 
Chapter V summarizes the research conducted in this thesis with analysis of the 
conclusions drawn from the research questions and hypothesis. Constraints and limitations 
that were encountered due to design or implementation choices are also discussed. Finally, 








The Department of Defense information network (DoDIN) is under constant 
barrage from malicious actors; the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) blocked 
over 300 million malicious actions every day in 2019 [8]. As such, the Department of 
Defense (DoD) has refocused its efforts towards improving the security of its networks and 
cyber systems. This chapter covers background relevant to the status of the DoD’s 
cybersecurity red teams, some popular red team tools, and the benefits of automated red 
team solutions.  
A. RED TEAMING 
The proliferation of cyber-systems throughout the DoD has coincided with an 
increased need to secure them. The DoDIN is a critical component of the U.S. military’s 
ability to project power and conduct operations. It is massive in scope and globally 
dispersed, consisting of ships, aircraft, satellites, cloud services, industrial control systems 
(ICS), tactical communication systems, mobile devices, and commercial and private 
infrastructure. There are approximately 15,000 networks inside the DoDIN that provide 
service for ~3 million users spread across 3,500 locations in 26 different countries [9], [10]. 
While the DoD is making significant efforts to improve cybersecurity, these cannot 
mitigate all of the existing vulnerabilities present in often decades-old fielded systems. The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that the DoD more often required security 
in traditional IT systems than in weapon systems,1 ignoring or not understanding that 
weapon systems are going to be integrated into the DoDIN. As a result, the majority of 
currently fielded equipment has little to no cybersecurity in place, increasing the risk for 
the entire DoDIN. Additionally, there are legacy systems and applications throughout the 
DoDIN that no longer receive vendor support or patching but are still allowed to remain in 
service due to the lack of a suitable replacement [7].  
 
1 The GAO uses the term “weapon system” to refer to major defense acquisition programs that include 
a broad range of systems, such as aircraft, ships, combat vehicles, radios, and satellites.   
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One proven method for improving cybersecurity is through red teaming. A red team 
is comprised of technically skilled cybersecurity professionals who attempt to penetrate 
and exploit computer networks using the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of a 
real-world cyber threat. The goal is for the red team to discover vulnerabilities and gaps in 
the security posture, training, and system configurations of the target systems so that 
corrective or remediation actions can be taken to prevent a malicious actor from penetrating 
the network. Additionally, red team activities tend to increase the response and reaction 
proficiency of system defenders to detect, diagnose, and mitigate cyber-attacks.  
1. Why Red Teaming Matters to the DoD 
The GAO found that almost every major acquisition program that was tested in a 
five-year period had mission-critical cyber vulnerabilities; the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense’s Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and Defense Science 
Board (DSB) had similar results in their reviews [6]. Examples of common vulnerabilities 
were weak or default passwords to critical systems and accounts, as well as a lack of or 
improper application of encryption systems. These are rudimentary issues that the National 
Institute of Technology and Standards (NIST) provides guidance on managing. This 
highlights the importance of performing red team assessments to ensure that program 
offices are properly implementing cybersecurity controls [7].  
The primary threats to the DoDIN are nation-state level actors, which are typically 
more advanced, harder to detect, and more persistent than hacktivists or script kiddies. In 
order to adequately defend the DoDIN, its network defenders must be highly trained to 
identify, respond and mitigate cyber-attacks. As such, the DOT&E and the GAO both rely 
heavily on DoD Red Team assessments to gain perspective on the status of the DoDIN’s 
cybersecurity [5], [6].  
The Navy adage of “train like you fight” is frequently applied to the conventional 
warfare areas, such as Air Defense and Anti-Submarine Warfare. It should be apparent that 
network defenders must also follow that adage in order to be prepared to battle cyber 
adversaries. Red teaming offers a unique opportunity for local defenders to “fight the 
network” as they get an opportunity to learn how their systems, firewalls and anti-virus and 
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intrusion prevention/detection systems respond to the TTPs employed by the red team. This 
improves the defender’s ability to recognize and respond to real-world events. 
Additionally, after the completion of the event the red team provides feedback about what 
mitigation efforts were most and least successful, further improving the response capability 
of the local defenders. 
Even from a non-technical perspective, red teams provide valuable insight into the 
security posture of the DoDIN. The DoD mandates that all personnel complete annual 
Cybersecurity Training, which includes information on detecting and preventing insider 
threats and phishing attacks; this training can normally be completed in less than one hour 
[11]. One of the DoD Red Teams, in a publicly available interview, stated that, “Most 
cyber-attacks are user driven… [they’re] easiest to get at and yield the most reliable results. 
We’ve never had a phishing campaign that has failed” [12]. This statement, even if taken 
as an exaggeration, clearly demonstrates a shortcoming in the mandated training. 
Additionally, the first indication of compromise or data breach will likely be well 
after an adversary has successfully conducted a cyber-attack. IBM assesses the average 
time between a breach and its detection at 279 days in the private sector [13]. For an entity 
like the DoD, where lives are dependent on operational security and information 
superiority, that type of lag in detection can have disastrous consequences. 
2. Status of DoD Red Teams 
As the DoD has aggressively expanded the scope of the DoDIN in an effort to 
improve connectivity to the warfighter, the resources allocated to defend these networks 
have not kept pace with this expansion. This can cause local defenders to receive training 
that is insufficient and/or unrealistic for dealing with real-world threats.  
There are ten DoD Red Teams certified by the National Security Agency (NSA) 
and accredited by United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), dispersed between 
the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps [7]. The size, composition, and equipment 
available to each team varies between services. The DoD Red Teams support exercises as 
an opposing force (OPFOR), providing testing for development and acquisition programs, 
and assessing the proficiency of the cybersecurity service providers (CSSP) [12]. 
8 
Currently, the DOT&E coordinates with combatant commands (CCMDs) to perform cyber 
readiness campaigns. These campaigns leverage DoD Red Teams to assess network 
defenders’ ability to detect, identify, and remediate cyber-attacks [6]. The GAO, DOT&E, 
and Navy Information Warfare Center (NIWC) Atlantic all noted that the demand for DoD 
Red Team services is very high due to the consistently positive results that are produced. 
There has been a push from DOT&E to have DoD Red Teams conduct Persistent 
Cyber Operations (PCO) that more closely align with what a nation-state would attempt. 
Currently, the majority of DoD Red Teaming occurs during exercises or training events, 
and as such is limited in scope and duration. Conducting PCO allows the red team to 
provide a deeper assessment of the target systems, and more realistic training to the 
network defenders. However, this requires additional personnel, equipment, and funding 
since it requires the red teams to spend a significantly longer amount of time against one 
target, often while on temporary duty assignment (TDY) [6].  
In their 2018 report, DOT&E explicitly stated that the manning models used for 
Red Teams across the DoD and the loss of talent to the private sector are serious concerns 
that must be addressed to meet demand for their services. Additionally, the DOT&E 
concluded that additional personnel, training, capabilities and other resources are required 
for DoD Red Teams to adequately perform their mission [6]. The GAO echoes this 
sentiment, going as far as to claim that the monetary compensation offered by the private 
sector is so much greater than what the DoD can offer that it places the DoD at a significant 
disadvantage from a manning and expertise perspective [7]. As a result, DoD Red Teams 
are falling behind in their ability to accurately emulate nation-state actors. The DOT&E 
report explains that most of the NSA and DoD Red Teams are only capable of operating at 
a moderate threat level at best, and that none of the teams can accurately represent a near 
peer nation-state capability. The report goes on to say that some of the red teams are so 
ineffective that they cannot be relied upon to perform future assessments [6]. 
The DoD Inspector General (IG) has a bleak view of the current and future status 
of the DoD Red Teams. A recent report stated that the DoD Red Teams are not capable of 
meeting current or future demands for their service [5]. The DoD IG determined that the 
lack of a coherent, unified plan to train, support, prioritize, and fund the DoD Red Teams 
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has caused this gap in capability. The report recommended the identification and 
development of a baseline toolkit/capabilities for the DoD Red Teams as well as 
formalizing a reporting process so that system owners and stakeholders can be more aware 
of red team findings [5]. 
B. CLIENT-SIDE RED TEAMING TOOLS 
There are various tools available that facilitate red teaming, both open source and 
commercially licensed. Among the most common tools are Network Mapper (Nmap), 
Wireshark, Greenbone’s Open Vulnerability Assessment Scanner (OpenVAS), Rapid7’s 
Metasploit Framework (MSF), Core Security’s Core Impact (CI), and Tenable’s Nessus. 
The Kali operating system is a Linux distribution developed by Offensive Security that  
is tailored to cybersecurity professionals and includes a wide range of open source red  
team tools. 
Many of these tools are employed from a command line interface (CLI) that 
requires the user to be well versed in this environment, as well as in the tool itself and the 
exploitation techniques that it leverages. This creates a barrier for entry that can be difficult 
to overcome for the average network defender. It is common for network defenders to be 
unable to receive in-depth training for many of these tools because they are prohibitively 
expensive for an enterprise as large as the DoDIN. The lowest cost for training and 
certification from Offensive Security for Kali is priced at $1,000 [14]; similarly, Global 
Information Assurance Certification (GIAC) training costs $1,999 for a single tool or topic 
[15]. Both organizations project between 30–120 days for individuals to complete training.  
Additionally, due to the high demand across the private sector for personnel with 
this skillset, the DoD has been struggling to retain the personnel it trains. The DoD is 
simply unable to match the compensation that is offered by the private sector. Taking the 
average from three different sources, the average penetration tester/red teamer in the United 
States makes approximately $93,000 annually [3], [16], [17]. This is well above the 
compensation enlisted personnel and junior officers can hope to receive, and results in the 
DoD getting minimal returns on its training investment. The DoD also has to contend with 
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its duty rotations causing constant turnover in personnel, greatly increasing its training 
requirements. 
The following section focuses on three red team tools: the Cyber Automated Red 
Team Tool (CARTT) developed at NPS, Core Security’s Core Impact, and Silent Break 
Security’s Silent Break Central (SBC).  
1. CARTT 
The CARTT was developed at the Naval Postgraduate School in previous research 
in the area of automated red teaming. CARTT was built entirely upon open source software 
running in Kali Linux, leveraging Nmap, OpenVAS, p0f, and MSF [2]. The application 
was programmed in Python with the Toolkit Interface (Tkinter) library powering its GUI 
[1]. The goal was to develop a tool that could, “simulate the actions of a red team by 
automatically identifying and analyzing vulnerabilities in computer systems, then 
exploiting those vulnerabilities with cyber-attack actions… by operators who do not have 
extensive training in offensive cyber operations (OCO) or red teaming” [2]. The CARTT 
user is able to conduct host discovery, vulnerability analysis, and exploitation from  
the GUI.   
There are currently two components to CARTT [2]: the first deals with host 
discovery, OS mapping, and vulnerability detection; the second leverages the 
vulnerabilities that were discovered in order to perform target exploitation. CARTT utilizes 
ifconfig to determine which host it is running on, then performs a scan to conduct host 
discovery. Nmap with option -sn is used to perform a ping scan of the host network, which 
is currently set to be the /24 classless interdomain routing (CIDR) of the localhost. The 
operator can optionally perform two OS discovery scans, using Nmap to actively scan all 
the hosts with the -O option, or by using p0f to passively monitor network traffic to make 
a determination about the OS of all the hosts communicating on the network [2].  
After scanning has completed, CARTT initializes MSF and OpenVAS [2]. The 
information gained from the earlier host discovery is entered into OpenVAS, which then 
executes a vulnerability scan of these hosts. In the current implementation, the operator 
must exit CARTT to interface with OpenVAS in order to populate the target list and 
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manage the scan results. Ongoing work will fully integrate these steps into the CARTT 
interface. 
The second component of CARTT is its extended cyber-attack capability [1]. The 
results from the OpenVAS vulnerability scan are downloaded to a local file that is parsed 
by CARTT. The operator then selects a host from the menu to see the list of vulnerabilities 
detected on that host. Once the operator has selected a host and vulnerability, CARTT 
displays a list of applicable MSF exploit modules. The operator can then select a module 
to receive relevant information about it, and then use the “Exploit Setup” feature to have 
CARTT build the corresponding exploit in MSF and provide feedback once it is 
successfully constructed. The operator can then run the exploit within CARTT, which 
instructs MSF to launch the exploit, with the results parsed from the MSF interface and 
displayed in CARTT. A flow chart of this process is depicted in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. CARTT with Extended Cyber-Attack Capability Flow Diagram. 
Source: [1] 
The primary benefit of CARTT is its ability to reach standalone networks that are 
isolated from the DoDIN. A device could be configured with the CARTT software and 
12 
then connected directly to air-gapped networks. A more extensible solution, however, 
should provide this capability without the need for a system administrator to build and 
maintain a Kali system with the CARTT python script loaded, running OpenVAS with 
GSA, MSF, p0f, and Python3.x with Tkinter, Subprocess, and Shlex libraries. In order to 
use CARTT, a system with all of this software must be placed on the target network, which 
itself presents an entry point for infection by malicious software. Additionally, OpenVAS 
requires periodic updates from the Greenbone Security/Community Feed to keep its 
vulnerability library updated. A client/server model for CARTT, which is the focus of this 
research, would solve these issues by allowing organizations to run a centrally managed 
server system that local defender “thin clients” could connect to and interact with [1]. 
2. Core Impact 
Core Security provides the Core Impact (CI) penetration testing tool [4]. It features 
a GUI with step-by-step guides on how to perform various functions of pen-testing. For 
example, conducting a Network Vulnerability test requires the user to simply press a single 
button and enter the target IP information (can be an entire network or individual hosts). 
CI will then perform network discovery, port mapping, and OS scanning using various 
methods, including universal plug and play (UPnP) protocol, user datagram protocol 
(UDP) and transmission control protocol (TCP) packets, and server message block (SMB) 
packets [4].  
CI then conducts vulnerability analysis by attempting to exploit the devices on the 
network based on ports, protocol, and OS determined in the scan [4]. It provides feedback 
on what exploits were successful and unsuccessful. Additionally, all of the tools, modules, 
and exploits are modifiable Python scripts, which allows the operator to have a great deal 
of flexibility to customize the tool. However, this requires a high degree of technical 
expertise [4].  
Operators can also configure the attacks for post-exploitation operations, such as 
privilege escalation and detection evasion [4]. This allows the operator to better simulate a 
real-world threat for the network defender to fight against. Additionally, the exploits can 
be configured to self-destruct once the operation is complete, reducing the work required 
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to restore the target systems to their previous configuration and ensuring that all malicious 
payloads are removed [4]. 
CI also gives the operator the ability to configure and conduct phishing attacks, 
providing feedback on which users and devices succumbed to the attack [4]. This allows 
network defenders to train their users in a live environment, and to identify additional 
training requirements. The NIWC Atlantic Red Team claimed to have never had a phishing 
campaign fail, underscoring the clear shortcomings that currently exist in DoD cyber 
defense training. Unfortunately, since CI is such a robust tool, it has a significant cost, with 
a single license costing $30,000 per year [4].  
3. Silent Break Central 
Silent Break Security offers the Silent Break Central (SBC) application [18]. SBC 
contains an attack simulation module that allows the operator to build an attack from its 
GUI. The operator selects criteria from a series of menus and enter required information 
into text fields. This results in a simple process to plan and develop cyber-attacks. The 
benefit of SBC’s approach is that a novice network defender should be able to navigate the 
GUI to launch attacks and get actionable feedback from the tool. The GUI provides a 
detailed description of the exploit, the risk factors, links to external resources and 
recommended remediations. Once the attack has been launched, the GUI will provide 
feedback on its success, which allows the operator to conduct remediation actions as 
needed [18].  
The SBC exploits and payloads are prepackaged, giving the operator limited 
freedom to customize some of the attack criteria [18]. As a result, newly discovered 
vulnerabilities cannot be leveraged by the system until the vendor has provided an update. 
There is also no functionality for the user to build their own exploits or payloads. Due to 
this limitation, SBC cannot be used to discover new vulnerabilities. This limits the 
application to a compliance enforcement function [18]. 
Silent Break provides other services, such as a password auditor and a post-
exploitation agent called Red Team Toolkit (RTT) [19]. The password auditor will attempt 
to crack passwords on the network and provided detailed feedback. Passwords that are 
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cracked, duplicated, weak, or set to not expire will be flagged, as well as the accounts 
associated with them. Alternately, RTT allows the operator to more accurately simulate a 
hostile actor in the network. While the attack simulation module only provides feedback 
on if the exploit was successful, RTT agent allows the operator to conduct persistent 
operations on the target. RTT costs $7,000 for the initial 1-year license, then $3,500 
annually per user [19].  
4. Shortcomings in Client-Side Tools 
Client-side red team tools share a common set of shortcomings. First, every client-
side red team tool requires that the operator have a fully updated version of the client in 
order to ensure the latest vulnerabilities and exploits can be detected. This consumes 
bandwidth to disseminate the updates and hard drive space on the clients to store the ever-
growing vulnerability databases. Additionally, if the networks are isolated, it can be 
challenging to ensure updates occur. Second, every device running a client-side red team 
tool requires elevated permissions in order to perform the host discovery and network 
mapping functions. This introduces risk to the organization, if a malicious actor 
compromises one of the client devices they would be able to conduct reconnaissance with 
a very low chance of being detected. Third, for an enterprise as large and diverse as the 
DoDIN, managing commercial licenses and access is a tremendous and expensive 
challenge. If each network only required two licenses, that would cost the DoD $105 
million dollars annually for the RTT [10], [19]. The high rate of personnel turnover due to 
periodic rotations in the DoD further complicates the issue from an access management 
and training perspective. 
C. WEB-BASED AUTOMATED RED TEAM TOOLS 
The previous section discussed client-side read team tools, including shortcomings 
with that model. This section discusses the benefits of web-based automated red team tools 
as well as two current services that are commercially available. These web-based tools 
were selected due to their highly automated nature as well as their ability to conduct 
vulnerability assessments and offensive actions against the target network.  
1. Benefits of Automated Web-Based Tools
Using a web-based automated system for red teaming would allow the DoD to 
avoid many of the issues present in client-side systems. A web-based tool would remove 
the requirements for every command or network to manage its own system configuration 
and updates. This reduces the administrative cost of managing the tool at the command 
level and the cost of deploying the tool to thousands of sites at the enterprise level. 
Additionally, the only device performing red teaming functions would be a centrally 
managed system, mitigating the requirement to add exceptions or elevated access control 
permissions to potentially thousands of devices or user accounts across the enterprise. This 
greatly reduces the risk of the tool being compromised by reducing its surface area. 
Furthermore, relying on an open source system avoids licensing costs, which could save 
the DoD hundreds of millions of dollars. 
While an automated tool is not a substitute for a full red team exercise, it does allow 
the local defender to conduct red team operations in support of compliance, remediation, 
and training. This would allow the DoD Red Teams to focus more of their resources and 
expertise on emulating real-world adversary threats. Automation is one way to reduce the 
barrier to entry and allow more personnel to share the workload. However, if the average 
system administrator is unable to use an automated tool to generate actionable results in a 
timely manner, then they simply will not use it. Therefore, any solution must prioritize ease 
of use, which in turn reduces the cost of training, both in terms of dollars and time spent. 
Training costs will likely never be completely eliminated but reducing them should be a 
priority.  
2. SCYTHE
SCYTHE is a web-based red teaming tool that can be used either on a local server 
or as software-as-a-service (SaaS) from the vendor [20]. The client operator connects to 
the server and is presented with a browser-based GUI that allows them to build 
‘Campaigns’ that consist of various cyber exploits and attacks. The operator selects from 
menus the components of the campaign, including payloads, exploits, target services or 
processes, protocols, timing, etc. Some of the possible cyber-attack options include 
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ransomware, phishing, and USB malware installation. These give the operator the ability 
to emulate the TTPs of real-world cyber adversaries [20]. 
Once a SCYTHE campaign is triggered, the GUI provides real time feedback to the 
operator that includes what systems and accounts have been compromised, and through 
what methods [20]. After the attack has been completed, SCYTHE will generate a technical 
report with mitigation recommendations. These features allow the operator to understand 
where the gaps are in the cybersecurity posture of the target, and to make technically sound 
recommendations [20]. 
SCYTHE advertises a wide range of prebuilt exploits and payloads [20], as well as 
the ability for the operator to create their own payloads and exploits. This would allow a 
skilled operator to use SCYTHE to identify zero-day vulnerabilities and vulnerabilities that 
do not yet have a pre-built module. The actual cost of a license is not publicly available, as 
the company opts to give quotes directly to interested parties [20]. 
3. Randori Attack Platform 
Randori launched the Randori Attack Platform (RAP) service in early 2020 [21]. 
Their stated goal of the service is to improve cybersecurity by allowing network defenders 
to practice defending against automated attacks that emulate real-world threats in a live 
environment [21]. The platform is designed to simulate the entire attack process, from 
reconnaissance to persistence. Its advertising suggests that the heavily automated system 
significantly reduces the cost of the service, however no pricing information is available to 
the public. 
RAP is a large deviation from most other automated red team tools in that it is 
entirely automated [21]. There is no direct interaction between the defenders and the tool 
itself, instead the system decides how to conduct the red team operation. While this 
eliminates the need for operator training, it also prevents the customization of attacks based 
on organizational priorities. The local defenders must trust that the Randori algorithms are 
presenting them with a realistic threat from a TTP, targeting, and capability perspective. 
While this is likely suitable for commercial entities, the DoD is frequently targeted by 
nation-state actors; which means there are a different set of TTPs the DoD must contend 
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with compared to the private sector. Additionally, if the DoD or Intelligence Community 
discovers a change in adversary TTPs, it may be unable to share that information with 
Randori due to classification issues. This would cause the RAP assessments to be less 
accurate and possibly foster overconfidence in the security of the network [21]. 
The system depends on an algorithm that Randori refers to as its ‘hacker logic’ 
program; this algorithm automates the attack and emulates the TTPs used by real-world 
advanced persistent threats (APTs) [21]. The platform takes in an email account for the 
target network and will then begin a series of automated functions. The first is to conduct 
network discovery, presumably the TTPs used reflect ATPs that have been or are current 
targeting the customer. After discovery the platform will begin a search for gaps by 
attempting numerous real-world exploits. The platform will provide continuous feedback 
on what it has determined as the attack surface of the target and what exploits have 
succeeded [21]. 
4. Automated, Web-Based CARTT 
In comparison to RAP and SCYTHE, this research is conducted using open  
source tools. This eliminates licensing costs and offers improved transparency into the 
underlying systems compared to the commercial products. Additionally, while the system 
we develop is highly automated from a user perspective, the system owner has the ability 
to create custom exploits and payloads using MSF. This offers greater flexibility than RAP 
[21], which is fully automated, while also putting guard rails on the operator that SCYTHE 
lacks [20]. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter covered the importance of cybersecurity for the DoD. It also covered 
the benefits of red teaming to the DoD, and the current state of the DoD Red Teams. 
Finally, it discussed several notable red team tools and products, including previous work 
conducted at NPS in developing CARTT.  
In the next chapter, we discuss the design of CARTT as a client/server model. 
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III. DESIGN METHODOLOGY 
This chapter discusses the design methodology used to develop CARTT. It 
describes in detail the three CARTT user roles as well as the processes for Administrators 
to manage the system, for Operators to build, perform, and report the status of their cyber 
actions, and for Commanders to perform command and control over Operators.  
A. CARTT OPERATION OVERVIEW 
CARTT allows local network defenders to conduct a red team audit of their network 
through a simple user interface (UI) that automates interactions with MSF, OpenVAS, and 
other specialized red teaming and pen-testing tools. This alleviates the pressure on 
Operators to become experts in the use of these tools and the requirement to deploy such 
tools on every network. Additionally, the automated nature of CARTT allows Operators to 
perform other work tasks while the scan is being processed. 
The Operator logs-in to CARTT via a client/browser interface and proceeds to 
configure and conduct a scan of a target network (such as their own local network). To do 
this the Operator enters some basic information, such as the IP range and a name for the 
scan, and CARTT then performs a vulnerability analysis on the provided IP range, 
returning the results to the Operator via the CARTT Client. 
Once the scan has completed, the Operator has additional options available, for 
example, with a few simple webforms and clicks, the Operator can select the host(s), 
vulnerability, and payload to audit. Once the Operator is satisfied with the selections, the 
audit can be run on the host(s). 
CARTT then fires the exploit with the appropriate options, collects the results, and 
returns the results to the Operator via the Client. To run additional exploits the Operator 
can select different options for host, vulnerability, and module. This enables the Operator 
to perform multiple tests without having to navigate multiple menus and subsystems. 
CARTT also supports Administrator and Commander roles. The CARTT 
Administrator manages user accounts, including setting appropriate roles, performing 
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password resets, and account unlocks. The Administrator is also responsible for 
maintaining the commands table in the database. The CARTT Commander role primarily 
exists for users at headquarters that do not need to directly perform red team assessments. 
It provides these users with a channel to send tasking and receive communication from 
subordinates through CARTT. 
B. SYSTEM DESIGN 
1. Architecture 
CARTT is designed so that a single server runs the processes and applications 
required to perform a red team assessment; this system will be referred to as the CARTT 
Server. As described above, the CARTT Client has three user roles: Operator, Commander, 
and Administrator. The Client is the web-based interface through which an Operator uses 
CARTT. The Target Network consists of any internet-connected devices on the IP range 
provided by the Operator. The CARTT Server, CARTT Client(s), and Target Network 
must be connected via the internet. The user may access the CARTT Client from within 
the Target Network, but it is not necessary. A notional CARTT architecture is shown in 
Figure 2. 
  
Figure 2. Sample CARTT Architecture 
21 
2. Operator Process Flow 
The full process flow for an Operator logging into CARTT and attempting 
exploitation of a target host is detailed in Figure 3. Every interaction with CARTT starts 
the same way, with the user connecting to the CARTT Client and logging in. The CARTT 
Server validates the user’s credentials and then redirects the user to the correct menu page 
based on their role. 
To start an assessment the Operator fills in a webform to configure and conduct a 
scan. The data provided by the Operator is used by the CARTT Client to create the 
commands necessary for the CARTT Server to leverage OpenVAS to conduct a 
vulnerability scan of the target network. The CARTT Client polls OpenVAS every few 
seconds in order to provide the Operator with feedback on the status of the scan.  
Once the CARTT Client detects that the scan is complete, it requests the import of 
the scan into MSF. The CARTT Server first downloads the scan as an Extensible Markup 
Language (XML) file, then imports that file into MSF as a PostgreSQL database workspace 
designated by the Operator. The Operator is then presented a list of hosts and vulnerabilities 
in the Client that are based on the scan results. The Operator then selects the host, 
vulnerability, and payload from the choices provided. The CARTT Client packages these 
inputs as commands for the CARTT Server to configure the exploit inside MSF. The 
CARTT Server then attempts to run the exploit against the specified target. The Operator 




Figure 3. Process Flow of an Operator Performing a Scan 
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C. CARTT SERVER DESIGN 
The CARTT Server consists of a PHP server, a series of PHP scripts, the OpenVAS 
and MSF programs (with related databases), a report folder, and a mySQL database. A 
diagram of the CARTT Server is shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. CARTT Server Diagram 
The PHP server is the core of CARTT, which is essentially a series of PHP scripts. 
The scripts that take input and provide feedback to the user make up the Client. PHP was 
chosen for the scripting language and for the webserver because it is a free, server-side 
language that is platform-independent and well-documented online. PHP is an interpreted 
language, making it easy to implement, test, and revise code in real-time. Additionally, it 
has built-in features to handle dynamic content, integrate with various databases, and 
perform web security functions. Running PHP on the server side is essential, since the 
required programs are on the CARTT Server, not on the user’s workstation. 
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OpenVAS is an open source vulnerability scanner provided by Greenbone 
Networks. It was selected for CARTT primarily due to its ability to integrate with MSF 
and its lack of cost. OpenVAS has a robust set of customization options, allowing the user 
to tune the vulnerability scan to their specific needs. OpenVAS also supports a variety of 
report formats. Additionally, Linux distributions such as Kali and Ubuntu maintain 
packages or come pre-installed with OpenVAS, making it easy to configure and run the 
program. OpenVAS uses a PostgreSQL or SQL Lite database to store user information, as 
well as scan, task, and target configuration, and report data. OpenVAS also uses a Redis 
database to store temporary data during scans. 
CARTT uses MSF to parse the vulnerability report from OpenVAS, perform 
exploitation, and interact with the OpenVAS scanner. MSF is incredibly well-documented 
and widely used, which, along with the built-in integration with OpenVAS, were key 
factors behind the decision to use it in CARTT. Additionally, a free version of MSF is 
provided by Rapid7 which keeps the project at zero cost. MSF itself relies on a PostgreSQL 
database to store imported scan data, such as hosts and vulnerabilities, found in an 
OpenVAS scan.  
The concept of a role-based system for CARTT users necessitates the ability for 
users to send messages amongst themselves, which requires some type of messaging 
database within CARTT. We chose mySQL for this because it is free, open source, well 
documented, works on numerous operating systems, and has robust PHP integration. There 
are also mySQL tools available that allow GUI-based management, simplifying the initial 
setup and configuration of the database. The mySQL database processes queries quickly 
and is designed to be scalable, both of which are essential for a wide deployment of 
CARTT.  
In order to facilitate the flow of completed vulnerability scans from OpenVAS into 
MSF, CARTT instructs OpenVAS to save a local copy of the specified scan. CARTT then 
commands MSF to import the scan from the saved file. The scan is saved in a folder in the 
local directory, which allows CARTT to use relative paths to download and import the 
required reports.  
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1. Server Functions 
In addition to housing OpenVAS, MSF, and the PHP server, the CARTT Server is 
required to provide systems for communication between CARTT users, administration of 
CARTT accounts, and security mechanisms. 
a. Messaging System 
In order to facilitate command and control between the Commander and Operator 
user roles, CARTT has a messaging system. This system allows users to communicate 
through the CARTT Server at the command level; there is no direct user-to-user messaging. 
Commanders can use the system to task subordinate commands to perform scans, report 
results, provide feedback, etc. Operators and Commanders are able to view messages sent 
to their command and to send messages, such as acknowledgements, status reports, and 
updates. 
b. Administration 
Administration of CARTT user accounts and permissions is handled by users 
logged into the Administrator role. These users can perform functions such as account 
unlock, password reset, account creation and removal, and role assignment. Additionally, 
Administrators manage the commands table in the database. 
New users request an account by filling in a webform, including the requested role. 
Administrators then adjudicate the request and assign the user the appropriate role. Due to 
the difference in the functions of the roles, users will be presented with different web pages 
and CARTT capabilities based on their assigned role.  
c. Security 
In order to prevent unauthorized use, CARTT employs built in PHP tools to create 
and manage sessions, perform password hashing, and perform webpage redirects to prevent 
unauthorized users from accessing the system. User permissions are also validated to 
ensure that appropriate permission checks for valid users are performed, for example an 
Operator cannot access an Administrator page. Upon account creation user passwords are 
26 
salted and hashed before being stored in the mySQL database as a 61-character string. 
Additionally, input validation is performed on user provided text fields in order to mitigate 
various types of exploits, such as SQL injections.  
D. CARTT CLIENT DESIGN 
As stated in Section B, CARTT has three client modes: Operator, Commander, and 
Administrator. Separating the users into the three roles makes it easier to conceptualize the 
relationships that exist between users at various levels in the CARTT Client. Upon logging 
in users are presented with the menu screen relevant to their assigned role. 
In order to maintain simplicity, radio buttons are used whenever possible to allow 
the user to select their desired action. Text fields are used whenever user input is needed, 
and these fields are labeled and provide feedback if the user input is invalid or improper.  
1. Login and Registration 
In order to login to CARTT, a simple web form is provided, as shown in Figure 5. 
The web form asks for the user’s email address that was used during registration and the 
password via two text fields. Feedback is provided to inform the user if the login attempt 
fails. If the user fails a defined number of login attempts, the account will be locked and 
the user redirected to a different page outlining the unlock process. The login page also 
allows the user to immediately jump to the unlock page. 
 
Figure 5. CARTT Login Page 
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The registration page, shown in Figure 6, is also designed with as much simplicity 
as possible. The fields are clearly labeled and provide feedback if the data entered does not 
conform to the requirements for that field (such as length or input type). The user is 
required to enter an email address, which will act as a unique identifier for their account. 
Email was chosen since every DoD employee has a unique, DoD provided email address. 
Passwords are required to be a minimum of twelve alphanumeric and special characters. 
Every command in the DoD has a unique Unit Identification Code (UIC), which is used by 
CARTT to understand the relationship between commands that is required for the 
Commander role to function. The user’s full name is requested to make it easier to map the 
DoD email to a specific individual. The requested role field allows Administrators to 
properly adjudicate and assign the correct role(s) to the new account. This prevents users 
from directly assigning themselves a role inappropriately. 
 
Figure 6. CARTT Registration Page 
2. Commander Interface 
The Commander role is designed for users that reside in higher headquarter 
commands. This role should not have the ability to conduct assessments directly, as its 
primary function will be command and control of Operator level users. Commanders have 
the ability to send and receive messages through the UI, which are viewable by all CARTT 
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users at the receiving command(s) and act as a means to convey tasking or share 
information. The Commander role shares the messaging interface with the Operator role, 
shown in Figure 7. 
The messaging system allows the user (Operators and Commanders) to send 
messages to the desired command, identified by its UIC. The UIC is used as the command 
identifier since it is unique, does not change, and is easy to look up. If the UIC entered into 
the text field below is incorrect or not in the ‘Command’ table, the user will receive an 
error. The messages themselves are submitted by the user in a text box with a max length 
of 255 characters to keep the tasking and responses concise and easily digestible. The 
message system also enables the Operator or Commander to view all of the messages 
addresses to their UIC. Previous messages are displayed chronologically, followed by input 
fields for the Operator/Commander to create a new message. 
 
Figure 7. Messaging Interface 
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3. Operator Interface 
The Operator role conducts most of the red teaming functionality in CARTT. This 
role allows users to perform assessments, fire exploits against the target network, and view 
and create messages to other CARTT Operators or Commanders. Upon logging in as an 
Operator, the user will be presented with a menu of task options, as show in Figure 8. 
a. Operator Menu 
Radio buttons are used in the main menu to ensure the Operator can only select one 
option at a time. The options are labeled so that Operators should easily understand the 
task that each represents, show in Figure 8. Additionally, the options are in the same 
sequence of how the Operator would conduct the tasks, making the menu similar to a 
checklist for the Operator. Pressing submit will redirect the Operator to the appropriate 
web page to perform the selected task. 
 
Figure 8. Operator Main Menu 
b. Scan Configuration 
The first option in the Operator main menu is the CARTT Scan Page, shown in 
Figure 9. It presents a series of text boxes that allow the Operator to input a desired target 
network, scan name, and workspace. It has the same principles applied to it as the 
registration page (i.e., the fields are clearly labeled and provide feedback if they are filled 
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out incorrectly), for example, if an invalid IP address is entered the page will update to 
display the message “<User Entered IP> is not a valid IP Address.”  If invalid characters 
are entered in the Scan Name field, the Operator receives an error message to this effect, 
and is then able to enter new values into the webform. These scan input fields were chosen 
because they are the minimum information required by OpenVAS to perform. 
 
Figure 9. Scan Creation Page 
c. Scan Status 
The second option in the main menu allows the Operator to check the progress of a 
scan. This check is performed by scan name, which the user will provide in a simple text 
field, shown in Figure 10. This supports the Scan Import task (described in the next section) 
by allowing the user to verify that a previously initiated scan has completed and is ready 
for import. If CARTT finds the scan to be complete, it will notify the user and then redirect 
them to the Scan Import page after a 10 second delay. If the scan is not yet complete, its 
updated progress will be displayed on the page. In order to assist the Operator, a list of all 
the tasks and their current status are displayed at the bottom of the page. 
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Figure 10. Scan Status Page 
d. Scan Start 
The third option in the main menu allows the Operator to start a previously 
configured scan. This is intended to save time when repeatedly conducting scans on the 
same target network. This page provides the Operator with a list of all previously 
configured scans in OpenVAS as well as their associated ID numbers. The Operator can 
simply enter the desired scan Task ID into the text field for CARTT to initiate the scan. 




Figure 11. Sample CARTT Scan Start Page 
e. Scan Import 
The fourth option in the main menu allows the Operator to import an existing 
OpenVAS scan into a designated MSF workspace, as shown in Figure 11. This task allows 
Operators to complete the scan import process if it was not completed previously or to set 
up a separate workspace using a previous scan. This functionality is necessary since large 
networks or a heavy load on the CARTT Server can cause vulnerability scans to take 
several hours. Additionally, allowing the Operator to specify their desired workspace, 
rather than having workspaces assigned by UIC, allows Operators at the same command 
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to work on scans of different target networks. This requires the Operator to know the exact 
name of a previously completed scan, which they can verify in the Scan Status Page 
discussed in Section C. 
 
Figure 12. Scan Import Page 
f. Exploitation System 
The fifth option in the Operator main menu allows them to interact with a 
designated MSF workspace in order to configure and test an exploit. The Operator is 
prompted for the name of an MSF workspace that has previously had an OpenVAS scan 
imported into it, shown in Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13. Workspace Selection Page 
The Operator is then presented with a list of hosts found in the workspace. The 
Operator is able to enter the IP address of one of those hosts into CARTT for further 
analysis. CARTT will display the list of vulnerabilities associated with the selected host 
shown in Figure 14.  
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Figure 14. Vulnerability List for Host 17.10.42.239 
This allows the Operator to select one vulnerability by its common vulnerabilities 
and exposure (CVE) number. The selected vulnerability will then be used to search the 
MSF exploit database, any exploit modules that might be compatible with the selected  
CVE are displayed for the Operator as shown in Figure 15. At this point the Operator can 
enter one of the displayed modules into the text field, which completes the configuration 
process for exploitation. The Operator will be redirected to the Exploit Results Page after 
a short delay. 
 
Figure 15. Modules Associated with CVE-2017-0143 
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CARTT attempts to exploit the target host using the Operator provided exploit 
module. CARTT provides the user with the raw feedback from MSF, allowing the Operator 
to assess the efficacy of the exploit. Figure 16 is the Operator’s view after a successful 
exploit attempt that leveraged a PSEXEC module under CVE-2017-0143 against host 
17.10.42.239. 
 
Figure 16. Results of PSEXEC Exploit on Host 17.10.42.239 
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g. Messaging 
The final Operator main menu option allows CARTT messaging, and uses the same 
functionality and menu as discussed earlier in the Commander section (D.2) and shown in 
Figure 7.  
4. Administrator Interface 
Users in the Administrator role will be presented with a menu of radio buttons that 
will redirect them to relevant webpages for system and user administration of CARTT, as 
shown in Figure 17. The subsequent administration pages are laid out in a similar manner 
to the Operator pages, with a combination of clearly labeled radio buttons and text fields 
to improve ease of use. 
 
Figure 17. Administrator Menu 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the design methodology used to develop CARTT. It 
described the design requirements for the three CARTT user roles, Operator, Commander, 
and Administrator. It also defined the required processes for Administrators to manage the 
CARTT system and user accounts, for Operators to build, perform, and report the status of 
their cyber actions, and for Commanders to perform command and control over Operator 
actions. The next chapter discusses the implementation of CARTT, specifically how PHP 
is used to interact with MSF, OpenVAS, and mySQL in order to provide users with the 
features described in Chapter III.  
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IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
This chapter discusses the implementation of CARTT. It describes in detail the 
underling processes and mechanisms used by CARTT to manage users, support a 
messaging system, provide security, and interact with MSF and OpenVAS in order to 
conduct vulnerability scans and target host exploitation. 
A. SECURITY IMPLEMENTATION 
CARTT sessions are used to track logged in users and determine which menu pages 
and functions are accessible to the session client. Upon logging into CARTT the new 
session data contains the logged in user’s CARTT role (stored as an integer between 0 and 
4), email address, and a “loggedin” flag. When attempting to access any CARTT page, the 
CARTT Server checks if the “loggedin” flag is set for the current session; if not, the user 
is redirected to the CARTT Login page. If the “loggedin” flag is set, CARTT then checks 
the “role” field to confirm it matches the permissions for the requested page; if not, the 
user receives an error message. The error will prevent the rest of the PHP script from 
running, stopping the unauthorized user from being able to perform the related CARTT 
function(s). The implementation of this script is shown in Figure 18, where user roles 1, 2, 
and 3 have access to the page, but user roles 0 or 4 do not. 
 
Figure 18. Session Check Logic in message_page.php 
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B. ACCOUNT AND MESSAGING SYSTEM 
1. Account Creation 
The CARTT account and messaging system leverages PHP to interact with a 
mySQL database of user credentials. At account creation, CARTT queries the database to 
ensure that the user-provided email address is not already in the database; the user’s email 
address must be unique since it the primary key for entries in the database’s users table. 
This uniqueness check prevents multiple users from having the same login information and 
is performed with a simple mySQL select statement, as shown in Figure 19.  
 
Figure 19. Select Statement to Validate Unique User Email 
When requesting a new user account, the user is prompted to enter a password that 
is at least 12 characters; failing to enter at least 12 characters will return an error message. 
The user must also provide their email, name, UIC, and requested role in their request. 
Before being stored in the database as part of the users, the password is salted and hashed 
using the password_hash() function implemented in PHP. The user inputs, including the 
salted/hashed password and salt pair, are bound to variables and packaged into a mySQL 
insert statement.  Since user passwords are not stored in plaintext, a leak or breach of the 
database would not result in a compromise of user passwords. The implementation code 
for registering a new account is shown in Figure 20.  
  
Figure 20. User Registration Password Hashing and Variable Binding 
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2. Account Management 
All user accounts are implemented in a mySQL database as a table with the 
following columns: email, username, carttpw, role, rolereq, UIC, and is_locked. Email 
address is used as the primary key for each user, while username is a mandatory additional 
identifier to help differentiate similar email accounts (e.g., jsmith@email.com and 
jsmith1@email.com). As discussed in Section A, the carttpw column holds the hashed 
password and salt pair. For the role column, all accounts initially default to 0, which 
provides no CARTT functionality. The rolereq column represents a new user’s requested 
role and is collected from the registration form. This data is used by a CARTT 
Administrator during the account approval process. The is_locked column is used to lock 
user accounts and is stored as a Boolean value. If the user account is locked (is_locked = 
True) the user will be unable to log into CARTT and will receive an error message. Finally, 
the UIC column represents the user’s primary organization affiliation and is used by the 
messaging system. 
CARTT Administrators can perform account management functions through their 
interface, as described in Chapter II Section C. All of their functions utilize mySQL queries 
to interact with the database, the functions are: approve_user, delete_user, unlock_user, 
add_organization, and delete_organization. The approve_user and unlock scripts both use 
update statements that change a value in users, role and is_locked respectively. The 
delete_user and delete_organization scripts use delete statements to remove accounts from 
the users table and organizations from the commands table, respectively. The 
add_organization script uses an insert statement to add a new organization to the commands 
table. The mySQL queries used by the CARTT Server to approve users, delete users, and 
add organizations are shown in Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21. Sample CARTT mySQL Update, Delete, and Insert Statements 
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3. Messaging System 
The CARTT Messaging system is designed to allow asynchronous communication 
between organizations, identified by their UIC. The system is dependent on three tables in 
the mySQL database: users, commands, and messages. As discussed in the previous 
section, users contains all the required information for the user’s account to function.  
Messages has five columns: id, content, TxUIC, RxUIC, and timestamp. The id is 
the table’s primary key, and is tracked and incremented by the database. It is used to 
organize messages sequentially, and to deconflict any timestamp collisions. The content 
column contains the body of the message and is implemented as a 255-varchar. The TxUIC 
and RxUIC columns correspond to the transmitter’s UIC and receiver’s UIC, respectively. 
The timestamp is generated by CARTT immediately before the insert statement is 
constructed and sent to the database. 
Commands has two columns: UIC and title. The UIC column is used as the primary 
key for the table and represents the messaging organization. The title column is used to 
store the recognizable organization name. When creating a message, the UIC that is entered 
into the “Receiving Command’s UIC” text field is compared to commands and if there is 
not a match, the message is rejected and an alert is provided to the Operator or Commander. 
This ensures that messages are not being sent to commands that are not a part of CARTT.  
When an Operator or Commander logs into the Message page they are shown all 
messages received by their organization, i.e., where the message RxUIC columns matches 
the UIC of the session. Once they have crafted their message and it passes the RxUIC 
validation check, the message is created using an insert statement. Figure 22 shows 
examples of how some of the various queries used to support messaging are implemented. 
In the first line the statement that is used to select all of the messages to with the RxUIX 
column set to the same value as the UIC in the Operator or Commander’s session. The 
second line of code is how CARTT pulls the list of UICs from the database to ensure that 
the RxUIC the Operator or Commander entered is valid. The final code segment shows 
how the timestamp is created and the insert statement is packaged using the data provided 
by the Operator or Commander as well as their UIC from the session. 
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Figure 22. Sample Queries Used by the Messaging System 
C. CARTT USE OF METASPLOIT AND OPENVAS 
The Metasploit Framework (MSF) is a powerful cyber red teaming tool suite used 
by CARTT to conduct vulnerability analysis, through interaction with OpenVAS, and to 
exploit target hosts. All CARTT scripts that interact with MSF, except for exploit_test, 
invoke it by using PHP’s proc_open() function, since it allows CARTT to establish two-
way communication with the forked MSF process. The proc_open() function is passed an 
array of file descriptors that designate the standard input (stdin) and standard output 
(stdout) for the new instance of MSF. A PHP function msf_connect(), shown in Figure 23, 
was written to handle the creation of new MSF processes. The function returns an array 
that stores the new process ID and communication pipes. MSF is then invoked using the -
q option, which suppresses the ASCII splash screen that MSF displays upon startup.  
1. Interacting with OpenVAS 
a. OpenVAS Connection 
CARTT does not interact with OpenVAS directly, but through MSF, which has 
prebuilt functions for using the MSF interactive console to perform OpenVAS functions. 
CARTT uses the communication pipe established by PHP, discussed in Section C, to send 
MSF instructions to load and connect to OpenVAS with the credentials provided. These 
credentials are created when OpenVAS is first configured on the CARTT Server and are 
shielded from the CARTT Client. After CARTT sends the command to connect to 
OpenVAS, it parses the stdout from MSF, searching for the string “OpenVAS connection 
successful.”  The first nine lines provided in stdout are discarded as the success or fail 
messages from MSF always occur after them. If CARTT does not find the success string 
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in stdout, it throws an exception and informs the Operator that the connection failed. Figure 
24 shows the PHP code that enables CARTT to load and connect to OpenVAS. The two 
variables $openvasID and $openvasPW are the OpenVAS credentials mentioned 
earlier and are hard coded within CARTT.  
 
Figure 23. Msf_connect() Function used by CARTT to Create MSF Processes 
 
Figure 24. Commands Used to Load and Connect to OpenVAS Inside MSF 
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b. OpenVAS Targets and Tasks 
Once a connection to OpenVAS has been established inside of MSF, CARTT uses 
OpenVAS-specific MSF commands to create, configure, start, and monitor the 
vulnerability scan requested by the Operator. First, the Operator provided scan name, IP 
range, and subnet are packaged together to create the target list for the scan, using 
openvas_target_create. Next, openvas_task_create is used to create a task 
in OpenVAS with the same scan name, the newly created target list, and a scan profile. 
OpenVAS has six predefined scan profiles; among these, CARTT is currently hard-coded 
to use the “Full and Fast” scan option, although future work could allow the CARTT 
Operator to select this. After the task has been created, MSF tells OpenVAS to start the 
scan by calling openvas_task_start.  
To track the progress of the scan, CARTT sends MSF the openvas_task_list 
command every three seconds and uses the output from this command to provide the 
Operator with the completion percentage for the scan. A function called 
openvas_task_status() was created to handle this process. It parses every line of stdout from 
MSF for any instance of the word “Done” and the name of the selected scan. If the scan 
name is found and “Done” is not seen, then the function tokenizes the string to extract the 
completion percentage and task status. If “Done” is found on the same line as the scan 
name the function returns an integer value (-10) to signal the scan is complete.   
Figure 25 shows how the OpenVAS commands are sent to MSF. $pipes [0] 
refers to the stdin for the process, while variables $targetID and $taskID are 
generated by OpenVAS after the target list and task are created; they are captured from the 
stdout of MSF and fed back into MSF in order to construct the scan.  
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Figure 25. Implementation of Target Creation, Task Creation, Task Start, and 
Task List Commands 
c. OpenVAS Reports 
The final CARTT interaction with OpenVAS is for its report download function. 
CARTT uses the MSF command openvas_report_download to have OpenVAS 
download the report as an XML file – named for the scan that was used – to the reports 
folder in the CARTT directory. OpenVAS generates a unique $reportID for every 
completed scan, which is required for the openvas_report_download function. 
CARTT collects the $reportID information by parsing the output of the 
openvas_report_list function and searching for the same scan name. The PHP code 
used to download the OpenVAS scan report and import it into an MSF workspace are 
shown in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26. Example MSF Workspace Change/Creation, MSF Report Import, 
and OpenVAS Report Download  
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d. MSF Workspace 
The MSF commands workspace -a and db_import are used by CARTT to 
instruct MSF to import the recently downloaded scan report into the workspace designated 
by the Operator; if the named workspace does not exist, it will be created. The Operator 
can choose to work in a new or existing workspace, however once a report has been 
uploaded to a specific workspace, MSF makes no distinction as to what scan discovered 
the host or vulnerability. Due to this, it is highly recommended that each target network 
has its own workspace.  
2. MSF Exploit Construction 
To begin the exploitation process in CARTT a vulnerability scan must have been 
imported into the Operator selected workspace. If there are no hosts or vulnerabilities found 
in that workspace, the Operator will be presented with an error message. For the 
exploitation process, CARTT creates several local files in which to store the hosts, 
vulnerabilities, and exploit modules. These files are named using the Operator’s emailID 
and as such are unique. Figure 27 shows how CARTT creates the hosts_$user.txt file, and 
a similar process is used for the vulnerabilities and exploit modules text files.  
 
Figure 27. How CARTT Creates the hosts_$user.txt File 
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Once the Operator selects a workspace the hosts and vulnerabilities files are created 
using the spool command to direct MSF output to a text file, then CARTT uses the MSF 
hosts and vulns commands to generate the list of hosts and vulnerabilities, 
respectively. Once a target host is selected, CARTT parses the vulnerabilities file to find 
all the matching items and returns those to the Operator. The exploit module file is created 
in the same manner with the exception that the MSF search function is used to get results 
related to the selected vulnerability. The PHP code for the search command is shown in 
Figure 28. For ease of use, CARTT requests the Operator to enter a CVE number, however 
other values can be entered that could result in valid exploit modules being found. For 
example, “CVE-2017-0143” refers to the Blue Keep exploit family, so searching for “Blue 
Keep” or “CVE-2017-1043” would return a similar list of modules. 
 
Figure 28. MSF Search Command 
After the Operator enters the selected module into the text field, CARTT builds a 
script file that will be executed by MSF. The file uses the .rc file format and is passed to 
MSF as an argument with the -r option on the command line, as shown in Figure 29. This 
is the only time in CARTT that MSF is invoked using the PHP exec() function; in every 
other instance, proc_open() is called due to the need for two-way communication.  
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Figure 29. Construction of Exploit Script and Execution of MSF with the Script
The script uses the set command to select the exploit module and the target host, as 
well as telling MSF to exit the session upon connection to the target. Color output is 
disabled in order to make the output from MSF more readable since color encoding adds a 
lot of unnecessary clutter to the output. An example script is shown in Figure 30. 




This chapter covered the implementation of CARTT as a Client/Server model. It
included a detailed explanation of the processes, functions, and systems leveraged by 
CARTT in order to provide user account, message, vulnerability scan, and exploit systems. 
In the next chapter, we discuss the conclusions and future work. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
A. SUMMARY  
The goal of this research was to extend the capabilities of CARTT in order to 
transform it into a client/server model while also adding user security features and a 
command-and-control interface. For this work, an Ubuntu 20.02 virtual machine (VM) was 
configured to act as the CARTT Server; the VM contains MSF, OpenVAS, a mySQL 
database, and a PHP server. CARTT was constructed using a series of PHP scripts running 
on the CARTT server. Users interact with CARTT through a web browser client on any 
remote device, while the Server interacts with the internal processes for mySQL, 
OpenVAS, and MSF. 
To ensure separation of duties in CARTT, users are separated into three distinct 
roles: Operator, Commander, and Administrator. Commanders and Operators are able to 
communicate with each other at the organizational level using the CARTT Messaging 
interface. Further, Operators are able to use the vulnerability analysis and exploit testing 
features of the CARTT service. Administrators are able to approve new account requests, 
delete and unlock existing user accounts, and add or delete organizations from CARTT.  
To test the end-to-end functionality of CARTT, we demonstrated that a user logged 
in with the Operator role was able to configure a vulnerability scan, start the vulnerability 
scan on a remote target host, check the status of the vulnerability scan, import a previously 
completed vulnerability scan from OpenVAS into MSF, and to perform exploit 
configuration and execution based on the results of the vulnerability scan. Due to the highly 
automated nature of CARTT, the Operator was only required to fill in simple text fields at 
every step, often using information provided by CARTT feedback from previous actions. 
We also successfully demonstrated that Operators could view and create messages from/to 
other CARTT users that are logged in as Operator or Commander. 
This research has demonstrated that we were able to bridge the gap between 
vulnerability scans and red team assessments for the DoD, while reducing the cost and 
barrier to entry of such a capability. CARTT accomplished this using open source software 
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and by automating the underlying processes required to perform vulnerability scans and 
cyber exploitation.  
B. CONCLUSIONS 
CARTT uses open source software to automate vulnerability scanning of a target 
network and exploitation of a target host. This provides the CARTT Operator with 
actionable information on whether a detected vulnerability is actually exploitable. It also 
provides a command-and-control channel for CARTT Operators and Commanders. 
Additionally, CARTT provides user authentication and a role-based user system, with user 
and organization management handled by the CARTT Administrator. 
The open source and automated nature of CARTT will allow the DoD to widely 
deploy the system with little overhead and minimal training. While CARTT is not intended 
to replace a red team assessment, it will reduce the workload on DoD Red Teams by 
empowering local network defenders to perform automated red teaming tasks. CARTT will 
allow local defenders to better assess their cybersecurity posture and manage risk, 
improving DoD cybersecurity. 
This research answered the following questions: 
1. Primary Question 
How can CARTT be transformed from a stand-alone application into a system that 
employs a client/server model? 
We documented the capabilities of the previous version of CARTT, including host 
discovery, vulnerability scanning, vulnerability analysis, and exploit analysis. We 
constructed a VM with OpenVAS, MSF, mySQL and a PHP server as our baseline 
architecture. We then created a series of PHP scripts to handle the interaction between the 
Users, MSF, OpenVAS, and mySQL that were handled by a python script in the previous 
version of CARTT. We then demonstrated that an Operator could use the browser interface 
to conduct a vulnerability scan (which includes host discovery), view the results of this 
scan, select a target host, select an exploit, and be provided with feedback from CARTT 
on the efficacy of the exploit. In our system testing, the target device was a Windows XP 
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Service Pack 3 virtual machine, and the exploit chosen was CVE-2017-143, which relates 
to the BlueKeep family of exploits. The MSF exploit module chosen for this vulnerability 
used ps_exec, and was determined to be successful after a meterpreter session was 
established on the target host. 
2. Secondary Questions 
How can CARTT employ a command-and-control channel between its Operators 
and Commanders?   
We used a mySQL database to manage user accounts and messages between 
CARTT Operators and Commanders. We created a database table, messages¸ to hold the 
required information for the message: content, message sender (TxUIC) and receiver 
(RxUIC), ID number, and timestamp. A second database table, commands¸ was created to 
store the relationship and title of organizations. At message creation, commands is checked 
to verify the receiving command exists in CARTT. The result was that Operators and 
Commanders are able to send and receive messages between one another at the 
organizational level from within CARTT.  
How can CARTT Operators use the system to remotely conduct red teaming 
analysis of a network to which they are not attached? 
We tested CARTT by logging into the service from a browser opened on Windows 
7 and Windows XP devices, and by attempting to configure and conduct a vulnerability 
scan to perform an exploit on a target host. There was no difference in CARTT’s 
performance between the client devices. This indicates that CARTT Clients should be able 
to target networks remotely from any browser-capable device. However, due to time 
constraints we did not set up further test environments to verify this capability.  
C. FUTURE WORK 
This research focused on the initial steps for transforming CARTT into a multi-user 
client/server system. Further work should focus on expanding CARTT’s capabilities to 
more closely align with red team operations and improving the user experience. The 
following recommendations for future work will further those goals. 
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1. Improve the User Interface 
The CARTT Client is functional but spartan, so future work should focus on 
improving the user experience. Every CARTT page is rendered in a browser using a simple 
white background with black text, and there is nothing to highlight particularly relevant or 
important information. In addition, information is displayed as lists of text, which can 
require the user to have to scroll through a lengthy list of information to find a required 
input field. Additionally, the messaging system is basic and provides no way to notify users 
that a message has been received. It also displays received message with no way to 
prioritize or sort them. 
2. Advanced User Mode and Post-exploitation Capabilities 
CARTT currently only attempts an exploit in order to determine if it is possible to 
launch an associated payload against the target host. Any shell session created by the 
payload between the CARTT Client and the target are terminated as soon as they are 
established. This was an intentional implementation choice to mitigate the risk of an 
Operator accidently carrying out an attack on the target, however, experienced Operators 
should be provided additional capability within CARTT to take actions on a target after it 
has been successfully exploited. Future work should focus on creating an Advanced 
Operator role that allows greater customization of scans and exploits, as well as creating a 
post-exploitation system for such experienced users.  
3. Improve Logging and Record Keeping 
CARTT stores vulnerability reports, hosts, vulnerabilities, the exploit script and 
exploit results. Hosts, vulnerabilities, the exploit script and exploit results are currently 
stored with the Operator’s email as their identifier, this means that CARTT only saves the 
most recent version, overwriting the files every time an action is taken. Future work to alter 
the naming convention of these files can create a historical log of the Operator actions. 
Adding to this, CARTT could then be able to retrieve and display this information, 
allowing Operators and Commanders to review the logs. 
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